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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FREAL STRATTON,
Plaintiff and Appellant
vs.
IRA NIELSEN, djb/a
J & I TRUCKING CO.
and SHERMAN KAY CHRISTENSEN
Defendants and
Respondents.

Case No.

12031

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by Freal A. Stratton to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the defendants, Ira Nielson, d/b/a J. & I. Trucking Company and
Sherman Kay Christensen. The action arose out of an
accident involving a semi-truck driven by Sherman Kay
Christensen and a semi-truck driven by plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury before the Honorable
Ferdinand Erickson in the District Court in and for Sevier
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County. At the close of the evidence, the court submitted
the case to the jury as to the negligence of defendants and
the contributory negligence of plaintiff. The jury returned
a verdict of no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff, Freal Stratton, seeks a reversal of the judgment entered in the lower court or in the alternative a
new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Freal A. Stratton is a resident of Henderson,
Nevada, where he presently resides with his wife, three
children of his own and five grand-children that he is
raising. (Tr. 107, 109). At the time of this accident, Mr.
Stratton was 53 years old and had driven a truck for many
years. (Tr. 107). He had, in fact, driven the very route
on which this accident happened for 20 years. (Tr. 108).
On or about April 28, 1963, plaintiff left Las Vegas,
Nevada driving a Peterbilt tractor and pulling a twoaxel trailer. (Tr. 110). The weather was clear and dry.
Visibility was good. (Tr. 111 ) .
Defendant, Sherman Kay Christensen, a resident of
Redmond, Utah, was traveling the same route on the same
day, driving a 60-foot three-deck cattle truck, fully loaded.
(Tr. 66). Mr. Christensen had been employed as a truck
driver by the defendant J & I Trucking Company, a partnership with its principal place of business in Centerfield,
Utah (Tr. 17), for two or three months prior to the accident and had no prior experience driving a truck of this
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size. (Tr. 66). His training in the occupation of truck
driver consisted of two or three trips to Salt Lake City
with defendant, Ira Nielson as instructor. (Tr. 67).
According to the testimony of Mr. Christensen, he
left Las Vegas, Nevada in the evening on or about the
28th day of April, 1963, and proceeded toward Los
Angeles, California on U.S. Highway 91 or Interstate 15.
(Tr. 70). Kent Johnson, a driver for defendant, J & I
Trucking Company, was in the sleeper. (Tr. 70). The
truck was driven by Mr. Christensen to an area known
as Baker grade which is a steep downhill grade for eighteen miles. (Tr. 71).
At that time four lanes of traffic were in use on the
Baker grade; two north-bound lanes and two south-bound
lanes. (Tr. 74, 75). Mr. Christensen stopped at the crest
of Baker grade to check his vehicle. (Tr. 76). At this time
plaintiff's vehicle passed the vehicle of defendant and Mr.
Christensen was out checking his tires. (Tr. 117). After
checking his tires, Mr. Christensen proceeded down the
grade and smelled hot brakes. He was traveling in the
direction of Baker, California and as he approached
Baker, he noticed two trucks ahead of him in the right
lane of traffic heading in the same direction. (Tr. 76).
The two lead trucks were approximately one mile in front
of Mr. Christensen's vehicle when he first saw them. As
they continued down the grade, the vehicle directly in
front of defendants' truck, which would be the plaintiff,
pulled into the left lane and defendant, Sherman Kay
Christensen saw the brake lights light up on plaintiff's
trailer. (Tr. 77). Plaintiff testified that he turned on his
left tum signel before pulling into the left lane. (Tr. 128).
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Mr. Christensen testified that the plaintiff's truck pulled
parallel to the lead truck (known hereafter as the Little
Audrey truck at which time Christensen was five or six
hundred yards behind the two vehicles. (Tr. 77). Defendant Christensen also stated that he saw the brake lights
of both vehicles come on and that he could tell plaintiff's
truck was slowing down to the speed of the other vehicle.
At this time the defendants truck was five or six hundred
yards behind plaintiff's vehicle. (Tr. 78).
Mr. Christensen could not remember whether or not
plaintiff put on his left turn signal, (Tr. 78), but he could
see the brakes sparking and flashing on the Little Audrey
truck. (Tr. 80).
The following testimony of Mr. Christensen is found
on line 17, page 81 of the Transcript:

Q. All right. Do you know what happened
then-what was going on?
A. "I took for granted that the vehicle that
pulled into the left lane, when he started slowing
down and his brake lights coming on, that he
would pull up along side and roll down his window and tell the other driver that his brakes were
flashing and sparking and smoking and he stayed
there and as I seen that, as I was back on the hill,
I started slowing my vehicle down more to compensate for the slowness of the other vehicle."
Mr. Christensen was in the right lane of traffic and
began slowing down to compensate for the speed of the
two trucks in front of him. (Tr. 81). Defendants' truck
was five or six hundred yards behind the lead vehicles and
Mr. Christensen pulled into the left lane to follow plain-

tiff's truck around the Little Audrey truck (Tr. 82). Defendants' vehicle then covered the five or six hundred
yards and crashed into the rear of plaintiff's trailer causing the tractor and trailer of plaintiff to bolt out in front
of the little Audrey truck, over into the right lane of traffic, and out into the desert (Tr. 86, 87), and defendants'
vehicle passed the Little Audrey truck and plaintiff's truck
and continued three to five hundred yards past the point
of impact.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.
The facts enumerated in plaintiff's Statement of
Facts come from defendants' own mouth or are uncontradicted. Plaintiff, driving an empty trailer, passed Defendant at the top of Baker grade. At that time defendant was checking the tires on his fully loaded three-deck
cattle truck. (Tr. 117). Baker grade is a steep downhill
grade for eighteen miles. (Tr. 71). Defendants' vehicle,
fully loaded, was traveling at such a rate of speed that it
caught the vehicle of plaintiff, which was empty, before
plaintiff could reach the bottom of Baker grade. Defendants' vehicle was five or six hundred yards behind plaintiff at the time plaintiff was alongside the Little Audrey
truck. (Tr. 77). Defendant testified that he expected
plaintiff to slow long enough to warn the Little Audrey
driver of his danger, and then proceed down the highway
(Tr. 81). Defendant knew exactly what was happening
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and was aware of plaintiff's actions and anticipated them.
Plaintiff was doing exactly what defendant would have
done. (Tr. 85).
The jury in the instant case returned a verdict of no
cause of action and in order to do this the jury must have
found, either plaintiff was contributorily negligent or defendant was free from negligence. It is plaintiff's contention that reasonable minds could not differ on either of
these propositions and would find them both in plaintiff's
favor.
Reasonable minds would not find plaintiff contributorily negligent in this case. The law clearly places upon
defendant the burden of proving contributory negligence
and showing that said contributory negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury. Ewan v. Butters, 16 Ut.2d
272, 399 P.2d 210 ( 1965). Defendant has failed in this
burden and reasonable minds would not find otherwise.
Defendants' evidence showed that its vehicle was traveling
approximately thirty-five or forty miles per hour prior
to impact and that speed was decreased to thirty miles per
hour at the time of impact. (Tr. 74). Defendant, Christensen, further testifies that plaintiff's vehicle was going
twenty-five miles per hour at the time of impact. (Tr. 94).
From this evidence, defendant set up the defense of contributory negligence claiming that plaintiff was negligent
in momentarily slowing his vehicle to warn a fellow truck
driver of his danger, when the entire event was anticipated
by the defendant driver.
Defendant has not placed substantial evidence before
this court point to contributory negligence, and this court
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has often said that if the finding of the jury is plainly unreasonable, demonstrating that the jury acted unfairly and
unreasonably, then that finding of the jury is not supported by substantial evidence. Seybold v. Union Pac. R.
Co., 121 Ut. 61, 239 P2d 174 (1951), accord Lemmon v.
Denver N R.G.W.R. Co., 9 Ut. 2d 195, 341 P.2d 215
( 1959) . The only evidence defendant has is its claim that
plaintiff stayed alongside of the Little Audrey truck for
one or two minutes and this evidence is conflicting for
plaintiff testified he was alongside of the Little Audrey
truck for approximately ten seconds before he was hit.
(Tr. 129, 130).
Under these circumstances plaintiff is held to the
standard of reasonable or ordinary care and while exceptional foresight, caution or skill in avoiding injury are to
be admired and encouraged, the law does not require them
as a standard of conduct. Hadley v. Wood, 9 Ut.2d 366,
345 P.2d 197 ( 1959). Defendant anticipated plaintiff's
action and plaintiff cannot be faulted for doing the act in
a more cautious and less expedient manner than defendant
claims he would have done it. The jury verdict is not
supported by substantial evidence and it is the duty of this
court to overturn that verdict. Dairy Distributing Inc. v.
Local Union 976 Joint Council 67, Western Confer. of
Teamsters, 8 Ut.2d 124, 329 P.2d 414 ( 1958).
Even if plaintiff stayed alongside the Little Audrey
truck for as long as two minutes, he gave sufficient warning to justify this action. Plaintiff properly signaled a left
turn before pulling into the left lane of traffic and then
he eased on his brakes, momentarily, to slow to the speed
of the Little Audrey Vehicle, (Tr. 120A), his brake lights
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were functioning as a warning to all those behind him
(Tr. 78), and the brakes on the Little Audrey truck were
flashing and sparking in a manner sufficient to give defendants' driver notice of the danger. (Tr. 80). Reasonable minds could not find plaintiff contributorily negligent
when the defendant anticipated the events exactly as they
happened. Such a verdict should be overturned in accordance with 5 Am Jur 2d Appeal and Error, Section 834.
Some cases have held that if the verdict is contradicted by compelling physical facts, it should be set aside.
Johnson v. Mercantile Ins. Co. of America, 47 N.M. 47,
133 P.2d 708 ( 1943). Plaintiff claims that he passed defendant at the top of Baker grade; that he saw defendants'
truck in his rear view mirror when defendant was several
hundred yards away (Tr. 120A); that he turned on his
left turn signal and pulled into the left lane of traffic and
was forcefully struck by defendants' vehicle. (Tr. 119,
120). Plaintiff testified that defendant was going sixty
miles per hour and that the crash was of such force that it
caused plaintiff's head to jerk back sharply and hit against
the cab of the truck, knocking plaintiff unconscious. (Tr.
130, 204, 205). This testimony conflicts somewhat with
the testimany of defendant who stated that his truck was
traveling thirty miles per hour at the time of the accident
and that plaintiff's vehicle was traveling twenty-five miles
per hour.
The testimony of plaintiff is more consistant with the
physical facts of this accident than the testimony of defendant. The physical facts of the accident reliably demonstrate a forceful collision sufficient to cause both trucks to
travel beyond the Little Audrey truck. Defendants' truck
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even traveled beyond plaintiff's vehicle and three to five
hundred yards past the point of impact. (Tr. 104, 105).
Defendant must have been traveling at a rapid rate if he
was checking his truck at the top of Baker grade when
plaintiff passed and was still able to overtake plaintiff before reaching the bottom of Baker grade. Defendant,
Christensen, also testified that his brakes locked up at the
point of impact although no one saw any skid marks in the
area. (Tr. 89, 90).
These physical facts, some concurred in and some
admitted by defendants' are before this court in the light
most favorable to them and are paradoxically apposed to
the testimony of defendant, Christensen, that he was going
thirty miles per hour at the point of impact, and that
plaintiff was going twenty-five miles per hour at that time.
Defendant, Christensen, was obviously doing more than
thirty miles per hour at the time of collision or he would
have been able to control his vehicle as he was warned
of the danger and anticipated it well in advance of the
accident.
The foregoing clearly demonstrates that reasonable
minds would not have found plaintiff contributorily negligent, and that conclusion, under these facts, must necessarily be followed by the conclusion that reasonable
minds would determine the defendant to be negligent.
The mere fact that there was a rear end collision furnished
some evidence of negligence. Mercer v. Perez, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315 ( 1968). "Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable person, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct
of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something
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which a prudent person under like
would
not do." Lasagna v. McCarthy, 111 Utah 26S:. 177 P '2d
734 ( 194 7). Defendant, Sherman Kay Christensen did
not act prudently under the circumstances and reasonable
minds could not differ on this proposition, as his testimony
clearly shows, he anticipated the accident, but could not
control his vehicle.
Defend ant Christensen was born and raised in a small
town known as Redmond, Utah, which is located a short
distance from the place of trial. Defendant, Ira Nielson,
was also brought up near the place of trial in a small town
known as Centerfield, Utah, where said defendant still
carries on a business. Defendant is a resident of the
County of Clark, State of Nevada.
The testimony of both plaintiff and defendant, when
coupled with the physical facts of the accident clearly
demonstrate that reasonable minds would not have returned a verdict of no cause of action in this case. The
jury was prejudiced toward the defendants and against
the plaintiff and the verdict was based on passion, or a
misconception of the law or a disregard therefor. If the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence, it is the duty
of the court to reverse that verdict.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GIVE PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS,
NUMBERED 1, 6, AND 8.
The plaintiff requested the following instructions:
"Instruction No. 1
The Plaintiff Freal A. Stratton brings this
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a<H1on against the Defendant, Ira Nielsen, d/b/a
Company, and alleges that on or
the 20th day of April, 1963, on Highway 91,
near Baker, California, the agent of Defendant, Ira
Nielson, d/b/a J & I Trucking Company, Sherman
Kay Christensen, operated a large truck belonging
to said Ira Nielsen, d/b/a J & I Trucking Company into the rear end of a semi-truck and trailer
driven by said Plaintiff and the said Sherman Kay
Christensen drove said truck in a negligent, careless and unlawful manner, thereby injuring said
Plaintiff.

J t·I Trucking

The Defendant, Ira Nielsen, d/b/a J & I
Trucking Company, admits in his answer that
Sherman Kay Christensen was employed by the
said Ira Nielsen, d/b/a J & I Trucking Company,
but denies any reckless or careless conduct on the
part of said Sherman Kay Christensen.
"Instruction No. 6
Before you can return a verdict for the Plaintiff, you must find by a preponderance of the evidence that each of the following two propositions
are true:
Proposition No. 1:
That the defendant's agent, Sherman Kay
Christensen, was negligent in the operation of his
truck before the elleged impact in any one of the
following particulars :
or

(a) in driving too fast for existing conditions;

( b) in failing to keep a proper lookout for
other vehicles; or
( c) in following too close; or
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( d) in leaving the right lane of traffic when it
was not reasonably safe to do so; or
( e) in failing to keep his truck under reasonably safe and proper control; or

(f) in failing to use reasonable safety when
attempting to pass another vehicle.
Proposition No. 2:
That the said negligence of the defendant, if
any, was the proximate cause of the injury.
If you find that the two foregoing propositions
are true, you should determine the damages sustained by the plaintiff according to the instructions
hereinafter given to you on that subject.
"Instruction No. 8
It was the duty of Sherman Kay Christensen
to use reasonable care under the circumstances in
driving his truck to avoid danger to himseif and
others and to observe and be aware of the condition of the highway, the traffic thereon, and other
existing conditions; in that regard, he was obliged to observe due care in respect to:
(A) To use reasonable care to keep a lookout
for other vehicles, or other conditions reasonably to
be anticipated;
(B) To keep his truck under reasonably safe
and proper control;
( C) To drive at such a speed as was safe,
reasonable and prudent under the circumstances,
having due regard to the width, surface and condition of the highway, the traffic thereon, the visibility, and any actual or potential hazards then
existing;
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(D) Not to follow another vehicle more
closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due
regard for his own speed, the speed of such other
vehicle, other traffic upon the highway, and all
other conditions there existing and to keep at such
a distance and maintain such control of his truck
as is reasonable and prudent for the safety of himself and others;
(E) Not to attempt to pass another vehicle
until he makes observation and ascretains that this
can be done with reasonable safety under the circumstances;
(F) Upon a laned highway to drive as nearly
as practicable entirely within a single lane and not
to move from one lane to another until the driver
has first ascertained that he can do so with reasonable safety.
Failure of Sherman Kay Christensen to operate his truck in accordance with any of the foregoing requirements of the law would constitute
negligence on his part.
The instructions above set forth relate the party litigants to the facts of this law suit and correctly state law
applicable to those facts. The instructions which were
given, when examined in their entirety, do not set forth
plaintiff's theory of this case. Instructions Nos. 4 & 5 are
the only two instructions which talk about negligence and
these two instructions do not come close to defining plaintiff's theory. Every instruction, 1 through 20, is content
with stating a correct principal of the law and none of said
instructions are specifically tied to these facts.
In Wellman v. Noble, 12 Ut.2d 350, 366 P.2d 701
( 1961), this court said that the purpose of instructing the
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jury is to correctly present facts necessary to be determined, together with applicable principles of law, in a
clear and understandable manner. The issues should be
presented in a fair and understandable manner. Hales v.
Peterson, 11 Ut. 2d 411, 360 P.2d 822 (1961). The object of jury instructions is to enlighten the jury of its problems. Johnson v. Cornwell Warehouse Co., 16 Ut.2d 186,
398 P.2d 24 ( 1965). The object is not to provide the
jury with additional hurdles to overcome. The instructions given were general and not tied to the facts. Instructions of this type are inconsistant with the case of Holmes
v. Herdebracht, 10 Ut.2d 74, 348 P.2d 565 (1960), where
this court stated that it is better for an instruction to cover
specific fact situation than to be universally applicable,
and as stated in Badger v. Clayson, 18 Ut.2d 329, 422 P.2d
665 ( 1967), the instructions should explain to the jury, in
a manner understandable to them, issues of fact and law
applicable thereto with reasonable accuracy and with fairness to both sides.
Plaintiff's proposed instruction number 1 clearly describes the parties to this
and the position they
filled. The instructions given, as a whole, do not define
either the plaintiff or the defendant, thereby leaving that
question to the speculation of the jury. This was confusing to the jury and made the instructions hard to understand.
Plaintiff's requested instructions numbered 6 and 8 related the party litigant, Christensen, to the facts of this
suit and correctly stated law which was applicable to those
facts. Instructions number 6 and 8 also set forth plaintiff's
theory of this case, and in a negligence action, plaintiffs
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are entitled to have their case submitted upon their theory.
Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 Ut.2d 276, 351 P.2d
952 (1960).
The trial court has a duty to cover the theories of
both parties in its instructions. Startin v. Madsen, 120
Utah 631, 237 P.2d 834 ( 1951).
The instructions as given, numbered 1 through 20 do
not contain plaintiff's theory of this law suit. One has to
look carefully to find negligence mentioned at all. But if
one does look carefully, he will find instructions 4 and 5
purporting to define negligence. Neither instruction clearJy defines negligence or sets forth the duties of defendants'
and it is obvious that instructions 4 and 5 are not related
to the facts.
All of the instructions are content with stating correct
principles of law. None are specifically tied to any of the
facts of this case. Plaintiff's theory of this law suit cannot
be found in the instructions. Prejudicial error has been
committed and this case should be reversed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GIVING UNBALANCED INSTRUCTIONS IN DEFENDANTS'
FAVOR.
The instructions, as given, were unbalanced in defend ants' favor. Instructions 4 and 5 deal vaguely with negligence. After a careful reading of these two instructions,
it is hard to find how they point up plaintiff's theory concerning the duties of defendant. The ambiguous nature
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of these two instructions confused the jury and did not
relate applicable law to the facts.
Instruction number 4 is a general statement of the
duties of every driver and could apply to either defendant
or plaintiff. Instruction number 5 is set forth as follows:
Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would have done under
the circumstances, or doing what such person under such circumstances would not have done. The
fault may lie in acting or in omitting to act.
You will note that the person whose conduct
is set up as a standard is not the extraordinarily
cautious individual, nor the exceptionally skillful
one, but a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence. While exceptional caution and skill are to
be admired and encouraged, the law does not demand them as general standard of conduct.
This is the only instruction purporting to propound
plaintiff's theory of this cause and is negated to some extent by the second paragraph. The said instruction does
not clearly point to the duties of defendant, but is a general statement of law set forth in a negative way to the
detriment of plaintiff.
Instruction number 6 pertaining to contributory negligence follows:
Contributory negligence is negligence on the
part of a person injured which, cooperating with
the negligence of another, assists in proximately
causing his own injury.
One who is guilty of contributory negligence
may not recover from another for any injury suf-
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fered because if both parties were at fault in negligently causing the injury the degree of negligence
cannot be weighed by the jury.
The trial court also gave instruction number 12 as follows:
Before contributory negligence would preclude plaintiff's recovery, you must find from a
preponderance of the evidence that each of the two
following propositions are true:
Proposition No. 1:
That the plaintiff was negligent in the following particulars:
(a) that he failed to keep a proper lookout;
(b) that he pulled out to pass another vehicle
and then reduced his speed without giving an adequate signal;
(c) that he reduced his speed when passing
another vehicle when it was unsafe to do so.
Proposition No. 2 :
That the said negligence of plaintiff, if any,
a proximate and contributing cause of the injury.

If you find those two propositions against the
plaintiff, he cannot recover even though you found
the defendants were negligent.
These two instructions, when viewed in the light of
the instructions as a whole, prejudicially accentuated the
theory of contributory negligence. This is especially true
when the said instructions do not place the theory of plaintiff before the jury and only vague, ambiguous abstract
principles of law are the guide posts for the jury verdict.
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Overaccentuation of the defense of contributory negligence, the positive delineation of the duties of the plaintiff, as contrasted with qualified negative statements of the
duties of the defendants was cause for reversal in the case
of Devine v. Cook, 3 Ut.2d 134, 279 P.2d 107 ( 1955).
In that case the court stated that such instructions influenced the jury in bringing in its verdict of no cause of
action and constituted prejudicial error. A careful look at
the Devine case leads one to the conclusion that it is directly in point with the instant case. The court concluded
that certain instructions, 4, 6, and 8, pertaining to the
standard of care required of the plaintiff on contributory
negligence, were positive and premptory, and that certain instructions, 8 and 9, pertaining to the standard of
care required of the defendant, were negative and nugatory. In this case instruction 5 does not delineate the
duties of defendant but places a general statement of the
law before this jury in a negative way. Instruction number
6 and 11 are written in a positive manner and accentuate
the theory of contributory negligence.
In the case of Taylor v. Johnson, 15 Ut.2d 342, 393
P.2d 382 ( 1964), the court held that the instructions contained no direct concise statement of the main determinative issues of fact in that case, and that the instructions
were misleading as to what would constitute negligence,
and were unbalanced in favor of t h e defendant a n d
against the plaintiff. The same trend can be seen in this
case; the law has not been applied to the facts; the defense of contributory negligence has been emphasised and
the duties of plaintiff positively delineated to the detriment of plantiff's case; the instructions are misleading as
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to what would constitute negligence. The jury has been
mislead and confused and prejudiced in defendants' favor
by the instructions as given. This is reversible error and
the duty of the court is clear under the Devine and Taylor cases, supra.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 12.
The only evidence on which defendant relies to support his claim of contributory negligence is the fact that
plaintiff stayed alongside of the Little Audrey truck for
one or two minutes. The trial court gave instruction number 12, which is fully set forth in Point III of this brief.
Under that instruction, the jury could find contributory
negligence on one or more of three grounds. They might
return a verdict of no cause of action by determining that
plaintiff failed to keep a proper lookout, or that he pulled
out to pass another vehicle and reduced his speed without
giving a signal or that he reduced his speed when it was
unsafe to do so.
There is no evidence to support the proposition that
plaintiff failed to keep a proper lookout, or that he pulled
out to pass another vehicle and reduced his speed without
giving a signal.
The trial court can commit reversible error by giving
an instruction on an issue which is not supported by the
evidence. 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error, Section 891.
Evidence pointing toward plaintiff's failure to keep a proper lookout or give a proper signal is not in the record.
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Plaintiff testified that he checked his rear view mirror and
signaled before pulling into the left lane of traffic and
defendants' admit seeing plaintiff pull into the left lane
of traffic and do not deny that plaintiff gave a signal. Defendants' admit seeing the brake light warning of plaintiff
at a distance of five or six hundred yards.
In the case of Hadley v. Wood, supra, the court states
the necessity for properly providing the jury with guidelines in the determination of a suit:
It is not the function of the court to recite to
the jury propositions of law in the abstract, however accurate or even interesting they may be. It
is worse then idle to do so. By including irrelevancies the process could go on interminably with the
result not only of boring but likely of confusing
the jury."
The court should not submit an issue to the jury
where the evidence will not support it. Morrison v. Perry,
104 Utah 307, 105 P.2d 347 ( 1940). Did the jury correctly determine whether there was evidence to support
the three propositions above set forth or did they find that
all three propositions were supported by the evidence simply because the trial court included them in the instructions?
This court has held that matters extraneous to the
evidence should not be submitted to the jury even when
such instructions are correct statements of the law. Griffin
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 102 Utah 563, 133 P.2d
333 ( 1943). The instructions did not relate law applicable
to the evidence and the trial court sufficiently confused the
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jury concerning the issue of contributory negligence to
warrant a reversal under the facts of this case.
POINTV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
DIRECT THE BAILIFF TO TAKE PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBITS INTO THE JURY ROOM.
At the close of the arguments, the trial court admonished the jury, but failed to direct the jury to take certain
exhibits to the jury room. These exhibits consisted of
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, received Tr. 126; Plaintiff's Exhibit
2, received Tr. 148 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, received
Tr. 153. All of said exhibits were properly received in evidence and were not of a technical nature beyond the
comprehension of the jury.
Plaintiff's attorney, in the chambers of the District
Judge, requested the court to direct the bailiff to take
the exhibits to the jury in the deliberation room and the
court did so.
However, the prejudicial effect was not cured by this
subsequent action. Plaintiff's case was prejudiced by the
fact that the exhibits did not go with the jury to the jury
room because the importance of said exhibits and plaintiff's entire case was diminished. The jury may have felt
that the delivery of said exhibits as an after-thought and
after deliberation had begun, was only a procedural matter and that said exhibits were incidental or of no importance.
All of the exhibits were plaintiff's and the exhibits
were directly connected to the cause of the accident or the
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damage of plaintiff, and plaintiff personally testified as to
each exhibit.
The jury may have concluded that plaintiff's entire
case was without merit if the exhibits were not important
enough to take to the jury room.
The Utah Rules of Civic Procedure, 4 7 ( m) provide
that:
"Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may
take with them the instructions of the court and
all exhibits and all papers which have been received as evidence in the cause ... "
That rule was certainly applicable at the time of this
trial and it was the duty of the court to see that the jury
was properly situated in the jury room with all necessary
exhibits before deliberations began. A failure to do so
was prejudicial error on the part of the trial court.
Prejudicial error on this particular point is emphasized when viewed in the light of the instructions as given,
which, as set forth previously in this brief, accentuated the
duties of plaintiff and negated the duties of defendant.
CONCLUSION
The evidence submitted clearly points up the proposition that reasonable minds would not have found as this
jury did. Defendants' only claim to contributory negligence was their contention that plaintiff stayed alongside
the Little Audrey driver too long.
The jury was moved by passion in favor of the defendant, which was aided by the fact that the instructions
did not contain plaintiff's theory of this cause; that the
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instructions were unbalanced in defendants' favor; that
law was contained in the instruction which was not substantiated by the evidence; and that the trial court failed
to direct the bailiff to take the plaintiff's exhibits to the
jury room.
All of the above taken together clearly demonstrate
a conglomerate of errors adding to a verdict based on passion and a complete disregard of the law. The judgment
of the trial court should be reversed and judgment entered
in appellant's favor. The least this court should do in
order to correct this miscarriage of justice is to grant
appellant a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
BURNS and PARK
by
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